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Chibueze: Bottlenecks in the Rome Statute

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: BOTTLENECKS TO
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN
THE ROME STATUTE

REMIGIUS ORAEKI CHIBUEZE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 17, 1998, members of the international community that converged at the United Nations (UN) Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries (held in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to July 17, 1998) voted 120 to
7 in favor of adopting the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC Statute).· The ICC Statute established a sui generis permanent international criminal court and became the first multilateral legal
document in recent years to detail the investigation and prosecution of

* Attorney-at-Law and Counselor, State Bar of California; Solicitor & Advocate of the
Supreme Court of Nigeria; S.1.D., LL.M., Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco;
LL.M., University of Alberta, Canada; B.L. Nigerian Law School; LL.B (Hons), University of
Benin, Nigeria.
\. See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. NCONF. 183/9
(July 17, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. The States that voted
against the ICC Statute include the U.S., China, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and IJbya. The U.S. and
Israel signed the Statute on December 31,2000, and on May 6, 2002, and August 28, 2002, respectively, informed the U.N. Secretary-General that they have no legal obligations arising from their
signatures of the Rome Statute on December 31,2000. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General, available at
<http://untreaty.un.orglEnglishlbiblelenglishinternetbiblelpartIlchapterXVIIIltreatyll.asp> (visited
March 13, 2006) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties].
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international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.2
Also, the ICC Statute confinns and codifies the principle of individual
criminal liability by unequivocally providing that a person who commits
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be held individually
responsible and liable for punishment. 3 This principle, which was first
propagated by the Nuremberg tribunal, evidences the recognition by the
international community that gathered at the Rome Conference4 that
crimes against international law are committed by individuals, not abstract entities and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes
can the provisions of international law be enforced. 5
According to the Statute of the ICC, the Court was established to ensure
that "the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole must not go unpunished."6 Also, the ICC was created to realize the determination of the international community "to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes, and thus to contribute to
the prevention of such crimes."7 Therefore, it is the hopeful expectation
of supporters of the Court that it serves as "a deterrent to future interna-

2.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 5(1). The Court may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression when "a provision is adopted in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 defining the crime
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this
crime." /d. art. 5(2). Also, terrorism and drug related crimes were adopted into the text in an annexed resolution and will become part of the crimes under the Court's jurisdiction once it is defined
at a review conference in the future. See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Annex I, Res. E, U.N.
Doc. NCONF.183110 (1998). Under this process, the earliest time aggression, terrorism and drug
related crimes could be included in the Court's jurisdiction as a crime is seven years after the statute
entered into force. See ICC Statute, supra note I, arts. 121, 123, detailing the process of amending
the ICC Statute.
3.
/d. art. 27.
4.
About 160 countries and a wide representation of non-governmental organizations participated in the Rome Conference. For a complete list of states and organizations represented at the
Conference, see Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.183110, Annex
II, ill (1998).
5.
See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentences, 41 A.J.I.L. 172,
220-21 (1947).
6.
ICC Statute, supra note I, preamble, para. 4.
7.
Jd. preamble, para. 5. The United Nations also suggested that the Court was needed to
inter alia, "to achieve justice for all," "to end impunity," "to help end conflicts," "to remedy the
deficiencies of ad hoc tribunals," "to take over when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act," and ''to deter future war criminals." See Establishment of an International
Criminal Court - Overview, available at: <http://www.un.orgllaw/icc/generaVoverview.htm> (visited on March 6, 2006).
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tional crimes, a contributor to stable international order, and a reaffirmation of internationallaw."g
The establishment of the ICC and the entry into force of the ICC Statute
on July 1, 2002,9 129 years after the idea was first suggested in 1872 by
Gustave Moynier, a Swiss diplomat and one of the founders of the International Committee of the Red Cross lO was one of the remarkable
achievements of the twentieth century. However, the understandable
euphoria surrounding the establishment of the ICC obscured the fact that
many compromises that were necessary to reach a successful conclusion
significantly diluted the original aspirations. The reality is that the ICC
Statute cut down on the ability of the Court to exercise jurisdiction
through the principle of complementarity. The ICC could act only in
those cases where States were unwilling or unable to investigate or
prosecute the accused. The Prosecutor could not act without prior approval of the Pre-trial Chamber. Also, absent UN Security Council action, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction after it has passed through
the layer of procedural rules requiring the Prosecutor to obtain the consent of either the State on whose territory the crime is committed or the
State of nationality of the accused. I I Furthermore, the UN Security
Council has authority to halt prosecutions if, in its opinion, such prosecution will not be compatible with its responsibilities under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. 12
This paper highlights some of the inherent bottlenecks in the exercise of
ICC jurisdiction that may diminish the Court's ability to uphold the principle of individual criminal liability. In particular, this paper will analyze the principle of complementarity between the ICC and States Parties
to the ICC Statute. Additionally, the legality of the so called Article 98
Immunity Agreement will be discussed. This paper without equivocation
contends that the conclusion of Article 98 immunity agreement by ICC
States Parties is a clear violation of their obligation to cooperate with the
Court and to arrest and surrender suspects to the Court. Preceding the
8.
Alison McIntire, Be Careful What You Wish for Because You Just Might Get It: The United
States and the International Criminal Court, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 249, 259 (2001).
9.
Id. art. 126, provides that the Statute shall come into force when ratified by 60 countries.
By the end of June 2002, more than 60 States had ratified the Statute and as of March 2006, about
139 States had signed the Statute and 100 of those States had ratified it. See also, Multilateral Treaties, supra note I.
10.
Gustave Moynier, Note sur la creation d'une institution judicia ire intemationale proper a
prevenir et a rep rimer les infractions a la Convention de Geneve, BUllETIN INTERNATIONAL DES
SOCIETES DE SECOURS Aux MILITAIRES BLESSES, No. 11, Apr. 1872, at 122, translated in Christopher Keith Hall, The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court, 322 INT'L REv.
RED CROSS 57, 72 (1998).
11.
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12.
12.
Id. art. 16.
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discussion on the bottlenecks in Court jurisdiction is a brief discussion of
the provisions of the ICC Statute regarding individual criminal responsibility.
In conclusion, this paper will argue that while the establishment of the
ICC is one of the remarkable events of the twentieth century, the highlighted obstacles are capable of restricting the reach and effectiveness of
the ICC as an institution designed to bring an end to the culture of impunity. Consequently, this paper advocates the elimination of said bottlenecks.
II.

THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL
RESPONSffiILITY

The principle of individual criminal responsibility is fIrmly established in
Part ill of the ICC Statute. Generally, it provides that an individual is
criminally responsible for his or her conduct. 13 The individual's criminal
responsibility extends to the commission of the crime, whether as an
individual or as a group, and includes ordering, soliciting or inducing the
commission of a crime that in fact occurs or is attempted; or facilitating
the commission of a crime, or aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in
its commission or attempted commission. 14 Also, individual criminal
responsibility attaches in other ways, for instance, where the individual
intentionally contributes to the commission or the attempted commission
of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose, when
that contribution is made with the "aim of furthering the criminal activity
or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves
the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court," or is
"made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the
crime."15
In cases of genocide, an individual would also have criminal responsibil-

ity for direct and public incitement. 16 Further, an individual is criminally
liable for attempting to commit a crime so long as the individual has
taken substantial steps toward commission of the crime, even if the crime
does not occur because of circumstances independent of the individual's
intention. 17 However, a timely withdrawal resulting in complete and

13.

ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 25(3).

14.
15.
16.
17.

[d.
[d.
/d.
/d.

art.
art.
art.
art.

25(3)(a-c).
25(3)(d).
25(3)(e).

25(3)(0.
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voluntary abandonment of the criminal purpose shall excuse punishment
under the Statute. IS
The Court's jurisdiction extends to all persons regardless of their official
capacity.19 This means that any member of Government or Head of State
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 20 Therefore, the official
position of the individual, or any immunity or special procedural rules
that may attach to the individual because of his or her official capacity,
will not bar the jurisdiction of the COurt. 21 In essence, national
amnesties, pardons or similar measures of impunity for crimes under the
Court's jurisdiction, which prevent the discovery of the truth and prevent
accountability in a criminal trial, cannot bind the Court. 22
However, it is not unlikely that the Court may consider the outcome of
credible alternative measures of accountability such as the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. The Court may do this before or after the
completion of investigation, if the Prosecutor, taking into account all
circumstances including the gravity of the crimes, the interests of victims, and other strategic factors,23 determines that it is not "in the interests of justice" to investigate or prosecute. 24 According to Judge Kau,
this question is not simply theoretical because the "Prosecutor operates in
the context of ongoing conflicts, often at the same time as peace negotiations are taking place, purely legal considerations may not always be the
sole basis for deciding whether or not to prosecute."25 The Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review the Prosecutor's decision not to
18.

Id.
See id. art. 27(1) which provides that the Statute:
shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In
particular, official capacity whether as a Head of State or ...... [any other capacity] shall
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. art. 27(2). Article 27 (2) provides that: "lrrununities or special procedural rules which
may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not
bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person."
22.
Amnesty International, The International Criminal Coun: Checklist for Effective
Implementation 6, AI Index: lOR 40101112000, I August 2000, available at:
<http://web.arnnesty.orgllibrary/indexlengior400112000?open&of=eng-385> [hereinafter Checklist
for Effective Implementation].
23.
Hans-Peter Kaul, Developments at the International Criminal Coun: Construction Site For
More Justice: The International Criminal Coun After Two Years, 99 A.J.l.L. 370, 375 (2005) (observing that examples of factors that might be considered are the protection of victims, the potential
impact of investigations on the conflict in question, and the question of the existence of national
criminal prosecution initiatives).
24.
ICC Statute, supra note I, arts. 53(1)(c), 53(2)(c). See also, Annex to the "Paper on Some
Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor": Referrals and Communications I (Apr. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter Paper on Some Policy Issues].
25.
Hans-Peter Kau, supra note 23, at 375. Judge Kaul is a Judge of the International Criminal
Court, and President of the Pre-Trial Division.
19.
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proceed with an investigation or prosecution on the grounds that it will
not serve the interest of justice. 26
Regarding command responsibility, the ICC Statute provides that command responsibility is a form of criminal responsibility in addition to
other forms of responsibility and that military commanders are not immune from responsibility for the acts of their subordinates. 27 Also,
command responsibility extends to any superior in a nonmilitary setting.28 Thus, Article 28 deals with the responsibility of military commanders and other superiors with respect to the criminal acts of subordinates under their "effective authority and control."29 The military commander or other superior is liable if he or she knew or should have
known that his or her subordinates were committing or about to commit
crimes prohibited by the Statute and failed to take reasonable steps to
"prevent or repress ... or to submit the matter to the competent authorities."30
The ICC Statute prohibits both "superior orders" and "prescription of
law" as grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, unless (1) the person was under a legal obligation to obey such orders, (2) the person did
not know that the order was unlawful, and (3) the order was not manifestly unlawfupl The application of this exception is limited because the
ICC Statute makes it clear that orders to commit genocide or crimes
against humanity are manifestly unlawful. 32
Also, mental incapacity as a result of mental disease or defect, involuntary intoxication, self defense, defense of others and defense of property
essential for survival during war times, as well as duress are grounds for
excluding criminal responsibility.33 Also, mistake of fact or law may be
grounds to exclude criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required by the crime. 34 However, "superior orders" and "prescription of law" are not grounds for excluding criminal responsibility unless
the person was under a legal obligation to obey such orders, the person
26.
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 53, para. 3(b); Regulations of the Court, Reg. 48, Doc. ICCBD/01-01-04 (May 26,2004) [hereinafter ICC Regulations].
27.
Jd. art. 28(a).
28.
Jd. art. 28(b).
29.
Jd. The words "effective authority and control" are intended to superimpose in a civilian
setting the requirements of the same types of relationships between superior and subordinate in the
military.
30.
Jd.
31.
Jd. art. 33(l)(a-c) (emphasis in the original).
32. Jd. art. 33(2)
33.
/d. art. 31.
34.
Jd. art. 32.
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did not know that the order was unlawful, and the order was not manifestly unlawful,35 The exception offers little or no defense as orders to
commit genocide, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes are generally manifestly unlawful. 36

m. BOTTLENECKS IN THE EXERCISE OF ICC JURISDICTION
A.

THE COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE

The principle of complementarity which permeates the ICC Statute confers jurisdictional primacy on national courts over the ICC. 37 In other
words, the Court has no jurisdiction over a case when the matter "is being appropriately dealt with by a national justice system."38 National
sovereignty led to the introduction of the principle of complementarity in
the operation of the ICC. 39 Article 17 provides that the ICC will defer its
jurisdiction to a national court except in situations where national courts
have been genuinely unable or unwilling to investigate and/or prosecute
the accused. 40 Article 17 is applicable even when the State's leaders are
themselves implicated.41
The Prosecutor is duty-bound to notify all States that might normally
exercise jurisdiction of his or her intention to commence an investigation.42 Thereupon, any State with jurisdiction over the case, whether a
State Party or not, may within one month of receipt of such notice inform
the Court that it is investigating or has investigated the situation domestically.43 Such notice may be accompanied with a request that the Prosecutor stop his or her own investigation in the case. 44 On receipt of the request, the Prosecutor must defer to the State's investigation, but may still
35.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 33 (emphasis added).
36.
[d. art. 33(2).
37.
[d. preamble, para. 10, arts. I, 17. (Article I of the Statute provides that the Court shall
have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction).
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCfION To THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 85
38.
(2nd ed. 2004).
39. See David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 59-60 (Nov. 200l-Feb. 2(02) (noting that Article 17 was ostensibly drafted
to accommodate and protect the United States' interest).
40.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 17(a).
41.
[d. art. 28.
42.
[d. art. 18(1).
43.
[d. art 18(2).
44.
The request must be made in writing and must contain information regarding the State's
investigation. See, ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted by the Assembly of States
Parties, First Session, New York, 3-10 Sept. 2(02), U.N. Doc. PCNICCl2000/l/Add. I, ICCASP/1I3, Rules 53 & 54, available at:
<http://www.icc-cpi.intllibrary/aboutlofficialjournal/Rules_oCProc_and_Evid_070704-EN.pdf>
(visited March 3, 2006).
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make an application to the Pre-Trial Chamber which may decide to authorize the investigation.45 To the extent that the Prosecutor has no
choice in the matter but to comply, "the 'request is really not a request.
It is a demand or an assertion by the State of its right to primacy." '46
Therefore, the complementarity notion in the ICC Statute replaces the
primary jurisdiction of international tribunals as was the case with ad hoc
tribunals such as the Nuremberg47 and Toky048 war tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia49 (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda50 (lCTR), as well as the mixed
tribunals in Sierra Leone, Timore-Leste, and Cambodia with priority for
national courtS. 51 This deference to national courts suggestively makes
the ICC a court of last resort. 52
Thus, under the complementarity provision, any State with jurisdiction
can effectively prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over its nationals by informing the Court of its willingness to investigate the allegation under Article 18(2).53 In the event that the Pre-trial Chamber rejects
such a request, Article 18(4) allows the requesting State to appeal an
adverse ruling of the Pre-trial Chamber to the Appeals Chamber.54 In
45.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 18(2).
46.
See Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Article 18 Preliminary Rulings Regarding Admissibility, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS'
NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 395, 401 (Otto Triffterer, ed. 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE].
47.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established by an agreement between four victorious Allied Powers at the end of World War II. See Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 AJ.I.L. 257 (1945) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
48.
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was established in Tokyo pursuant to
the Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at Tokyo, Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4
BEVANS 20.
49.
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, annexed to
S.c. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/827 (May 25,1993), reprinted
in 32 ILM 1192 (1993).
50.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. SlRES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1602
(1994).
51.
See Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. lNT'L L. 383, 385 (1998) (noting
that ICTY and ICTR raised for the first time the appropriate relationship between the jurisdiction of
national courts and that of an international criminal court which was clearly to resolve the jurisdictional conflict in favor of the International Tribunal).
52.
John Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination of u.s. Objections to the Rome Statute 18 B.U. INT'L LJ. 85, 94 (2000); James L. Taulbee, A Call to Arms
Declined: The United States and the International Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 105,
129 (2000).
53.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art 18(2).
54.
Id. art 18(4).
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addition, under Article 18(7) a State which has challenged a ruling of the
Pre-trial Chamber may challenge the admissibility of the case under Article 19 on grounds of additional significant facts or significant change of
circumstances. 55 With these arrangements, the possibility that the ICC
would exercise its jurisdiction without hindrance from one State or the
other is exceedingly remote because no State will wish the Court to
remove a case from its jurisdiction where it intended to conduct the
investigation and prosecution itself.56
In view of this development, the complementarity provisions have watered down the jurisdiction of the Court and created an avenue whereby a
State may use the complementarity provisions to shield its nationals from
the Court's jurisdiction.57 The Security Council referral ofthe situation in
Darfur, Sudan exposes this concern as it promises to test the effect of
such a referral. Already, the Sudanese Government has left no one in
doubt that it has no intention of cooperating with the Court and will not
surrender any of their nationals to the Court regarding this referraJ.58
Thus, after the referral, the Government of Sudan created a special court
to prosecute individuals suspected of perpetrating crimes in Darfur.
The Sudanese Government has not made any pretension as to its intentions in creating the special court. Indeed, as an official of the Sudanese
Ministry of Justice averred, "ICC Article 17 stipulates that it can refuse
to look into any case if investigations and trials can be carried out in the
countries concerned except if they are unwilling to carry out the prosecutions."59 Consequently, the Sudanese Government has gone ahead to

55.
Id. art. 19(2) (b), provides that Challenges to the admissibility of a case under Article 17 or
challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by a State which has jurisdiction over a case,
on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted the
case.
56.
Id.
57.
Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an International Criminal Court: Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal
Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. I (2002).
58.
See, ICC Delegation to Visit Sudan's Darfur, SUDAN TRmuNE, February 27, 2006, available at: <http://www.sudantribune.comlArticle.php3?id_Article=14271> (reporting that the Sudan's
Justice Minister Mohamed aI-Mardi told Reuters in an interview on Dec. 13, 2005 that Moreno
Ocampo's investigators would not have any access to Darfur, where ethnic cleansing has resulted in
killings, rape and the uprooting of 2 million refugees. The paper quoted the Justice Minster as saying
that ''the ICC officials have no jurisdiction inside the Sudan or with regards to Sudanese citizens,"
and that ''they cannot investigate anything on Darfur.").
59.
See Wim van Cappellen, Sudan: Judiciary Challenge ICC over Darfur Cases,
INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, June 24, 2005 (reporting that the Sudanese Council of
Ministers avowed a total rejection of Security Council Resolution 1593 and that Sudan's Justice
Minister, Ali Mohamed Osamn Yassin, has been quoted by local media as stating that the new
domestic institution would be a substitute to the International Criminal Court).
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allegedly prosecute some security officials over the Darfur conflict.60
This contrasts with the position of the UN Special Rapporteur on Sudan,
who has argued that the special court is not able to try Sudanese officials
responsible for violating international crimes in Darfur. 61 Therefore, the
alleged prosecution is nothing but a charade to shield Sudanese nationals
from the reach of the Court by taking advantage of Article 17.
In situations like this, the Court can only assume jurisdiction if it determines that the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution. 62 The ICC Statute provides guidelines on
how to determine the "unwillingness"63 or "inability" 64 of a State to conduct an investigation or prosecution. However, the word "genuinely" is
not defined by the ICC Statute but appears to evoke a requirement of
good faith on behalf of the State. 65 In other words, a State should not
proceed to conduct an investigation for the sole purpose of depriving the
Court of its jurisdiction without a good faith belief in its willingness, or a
good faith assessment of its ability, to conduct the investigation or prosecution.
60.
See, Agence France Presse, Sudan Hands UN Darfur Suspects List, SUDAN
TRmUNE,February 26, 2006, available at:
<http://www.sudantribune.comlArticle.php3?id_Article=14276> (reporting that the head of the
Governmental Human Rights Advisory Council (HRAC) Abdel Monim Osman Taha Gave a UN
official in charge of human rights in the Sudan, Sima Samar, a list individuals of the regular services
who have been tried for perpetrating crimes connected with the Darfur conflict).
61.
Reuters, Sudan UlUlble to Try Darfur Suspects - UN Official, REUTERS,March 6, 2006,
available at: <http://www.a1ertnet.orglthenews/newsdesklMCD652175.htrn> (quoting Sima Samar,
the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Sudan to the effect that "Sudan's special court for Darfur is not able
to try Sudanese officials responsible for war crimes and authorities continue to abuse freedom of
expression." Ms. Samar said the courts had not yet tried anyone with command responsibility for
crimes in Darfur and that she had only been given a list of 15 officers from the police and army who
had been tried for crimes between 1991 and 2003, before the Darfur conflict even began. "We did
ask for information and they didn't provide much information so that means that maybe they are not
able to bring anybody to justice," she said).
62.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 17(1)(a)(b).
63.
[d. art 17(2) provides that a State is unwilling if one or more of the following situations is
applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for
the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in Article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially,
and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
64.
See id. art. 17(3) provides that:
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due
to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State
is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
65.
Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New Inte17UltiolUll CrimilUll Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. LJ. 381,418 (2000).
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The process of determining whether a State is "unwilling" or "unable" to
investigate or prosecute invites judicial review of the States's decision
and/or its national judicial system. Ordinarily, States see judicial review
of its national court decisions by an outside judicial organ as an unwelcome challenge to its sovereignty. As such, it remains to be seen how
States would respond to a decision by the Court that the State's decision
not to investigate or prosecute was based on its inability or unwillingness. Probably, a decision based on "inability" to investigate or prosecute may be easier to justify as it generally stems from a breakdown of,
or unavailability of, institutions of legal enforcement. 66 On the other
hand, "unwillingness" to prosecute involves a deliberate decision of the
State not to hold the accused person accountable. 67
It has been suggested that a State may be unable to prosecute if it lacks
the required manpower and institutions to carry out a meaningful criminal prosecution. 68 Such a situation could have arisen after the genocide in
Rwanda, where very few lawyers and judges survived the 1994 massacre. 69 On the other hand, a State may be unwilling to prosecute a perpetrator if it demonstrates that it lacks the political will to do so. This may
occur where the accused is a member of the State Government, or exerts
influence over or accepts favors from those in Government.
Certainly, the situation in Darfur fits into this latter category as the Government has been identified as an active Party in the crisis and has done
nothing to disarm militias or end the "culture of impunity" there. 70 The
Human Rights Watch notes that "the Sudanese government's systematic
attacks on civilians in Darfur have been accompanied by a policy of impunity for all those responsible for the crimes," and requests that
"[s]enior Sudanese officials including President Omar EI Bashir must be
held accountable for the campaign of ethnic cleansing in Darfur."7!

66.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 17(3).
67.
Id. art. 17(2).
68.
David Rider, Canadian Judge Pans New International Coun: Arbour Says Rules Shield
World's Worst Criminals, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 21, 2002, at A7 (quoting Justice Louise
Arbour of the Supreme Court of Canada and former ICTYIICTR prosecutor).
69.
Id.
70.
See Human Rights Watch Report, Entrenching Impunity Government Responsibility for
International Crimes in Darfur, Dec. 12, 2005, Vol. 17, No. 17A available at:
<http://hrw.orglreports/2oo5/darfurI2051>; (visited March 14, 2006) (documenting the role of more
than a dozen named civilian and military officials in the use and coordination of "Janjaweed" militias and the Sudanese armed forces to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur
since mid-2oo3).
71.
Human Rights Watch, UN: Put Sudan's Top Leaders on Sanctions List: ICC Should Investigate Darfur Officials, available at: <http://hrw.orglenglishldocsl2oo51l2/09/sudanI2186.htm>
(visited March 14,2006) (quoting Peter Takirambudde, Africa director at Human Rights Watch).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

11

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 12 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 9

196

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. xn

Whether the Government and military officials of Sudan will be held
accountable or will hide under Article 17 protection is anyone's guess.
A related matter concerning Article 17 is that, under the guidelines for
determining "unwillingness" or "inability" to prosecute or investigate, it
is difficult to imagine a situation where an investigation or prosecution
carried out by western countries with an advanced judicial system and
history of criminal prosecution would be considered fraudulent. Developing countries, to the contrary, are less likely to benefit from the complementarity provision since their legal systems and political climate
could easily be judged unable or unwilling to undertake satisfactory and
successful prosecutions. As has been observed by Justice Arbour, "states
with relatively developed legal systems will have a 'major trump card' to
evade justice and will clash with developing countries that don't."72 Justice Arbour rightly posits that such a clash will be intensely political and
will risk the ICC becoming the true default jurisdiction for developing
countries, while subjecting the Court to major political and legal battles
with everyone else. 73 This may result in the Court being viewed suspiciously by developing countries - as a vestige of western countries thereby tainting the Court as an independent judicial institution. 74
While this paper questions the rationale for primary jurisdiction of national courts over the ICC, it nonetheless suggests that assessments concerning a government's unwillingness to prosecute should not be based
on lack of action in a single case, but rather on a systematic pattern of
judicial inaction in pertinent cases. 75 Where a judicial system is considered unable to conduct trials, the ICC should not concern itself with assuming jurisdiction; rather the international community should offer assistance and training to overcome any shortcomings. 76 In this way, the
ICC would retain the integrity of developing governments' judicial systems. This is necessary, considering the fact that governments constitute

David Rider, supra note 68.
Id. (quoting Justice Louise Arbour).
See, Fred Bridgland, Darfur Sanctions Deadlock as ICC Considers Prosecutions,
INSTITUTE FOR WAR AND PEACE REPORTING (IWPR), Feb. 28, 2006, available at:
<http://www.iwpr.neU?p=acr&s=f&0=259927&apc_state=henb> (visited Feb. 28, 2006) (reporting
that the ICC's main work is so far concentrated on Darfur, northern Uganda and the lturi region of
the Congo, and that this heavy concentration on one continent has perplexed many Mricans. They
argue that it would have made public relations sense for such a new and important international court
to have cast its net over several continents, including Europe from where it operates).
75.
See Wilton Park Conference, Towards Global Justice: Accountability and the International
Criminal Court (ICC), Feb. 4-8, 2002, at <http://www.wiltonpark.org.uklweb/welcome.htrni> (last
visited Feb. 18,2003).
76.
Id.
72.
73.
74.
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the courts' national partners, and their cooperation and compliance are
integral to its functioning. 77
Also, since States are likely to perceive the process by which the Court
determines a State unable or unwilling to investigate or prosecute as a
challenge to their sovereign powers, the Court is likely to refrain from
making such determination. 78 Conferring the Court with primary jurisdiction, ratione personae, over all cases within the Court's jurisdiction,
ratione materiae, would avoid the need for the Court to judicially review
a State's national legal system and avoid the likelihood that it would abdicate its responsibility in order to avoid confrontation with a State anxious to defend its sovereignty.
As poignantly argued by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, jurisdictional primacy is a functional necessity for an international criminal tribunal. 79 According to the Appeals tribunal:
Indeed, when an international tribunal such as the present one is
created, it must be endowed with primacy over national courts.
Otherwise, human nature being what it is, there would be a perennial danger of international crimes being characterized as "ordinary crimes" or proceedings being "designed to shield the accused," or cases not being diligently prosecuted. If not effectively countered by the principle of primacy, anyone of those
stratagems might be used to defeat the very purpose of the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, to the benefit of the
very people whom it has been designed to prosecute. 80
The Appeals Chamber rightly noted that States and/or their national
courts may not be able to handle the trial of some high profile persons.
For instance, in spite of the U.S. support, the Iraqi Special Tribunal has
not been able to conduct a hitch free trial of Saddam Hussein and some

77.
[d.
78.
In a related development, the general approach followed by the Office of the Prosecutor
with respect to its proprio motu powers indicates a clear preference for initiating investigations of
alleged core crimes, wherever possible, on the basis of a referral by a State Party pursuant to Article
14 or by the Security Council pursuant to Article 13(b). While this predilection does not mean, of
course, that the Prosecutor will never exercise the authority to initiate investigations proprio motu,
the Prosecutor seems inclined not to use these powers unless absolutely necessary, for example
where states have failed to refer an objectively serious situation. See Paper on Some Policy Issues,
supra note 24; Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 8, 2003).
79. Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1, P 58-59 (ICTY Oct. 2, 1995) (Appeal on Jurisdiction)
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appellate Decision on Jurisdiction].
80.

[d.
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members of his Baath PartyY The chaotic scenes that have marred the
trial so far have prompted one commentator to suggest that the whole
trial is being undermined and to observe:
I think it was a big mistake that this trial was held in Iraq because the judge, you cannot find a person, one individual today
in Iraq - judge, lawyer, prosecutor who is impartial vis-a-vis
Saddam Hussein. Either they are with him or against him.82
Therefore, the Court is in a better position to withstand the political pressure associated with prosecuting high level individuals and avoid allegations of unfairness that may be leveled against a State. The Court will
also hold individuals to a worldwide standard of international justice.83
This approach would promote universal and uniform individual criminal
responsibility for the crimes concerned because any person accused of a
core crime would normally be tried by the ICC, not by national COurtS.84

Saddam Walks Out in Trial Uproar, BBC NEWS, January 29, 2006, available at
81.
<http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhilmiddle3astl46S9274.stm>.
82.
Id. (referring to Saad Djebbar, an international lawyer and commentator on Middle East
politics).
83.
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to
Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11,60 (1997) (noting
that "[a] pennanent system of international criminal justice based on a preexisting international
criminal statute would allow any person from any nation to be held accountable for violations. Equal
treatment for violators would be guaranteed.").
84.
See Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: The Failure Of States To Enact
Effective Implementing Legislation, AI Index: lOR 401019/2004, I Sept. 2004, [hereinafter AI:
Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation] available at:
<http://web.arnnesty.orgllibrarylIndexIENGIOR400192004?open&of=ENG-385> (observing that
not many States have enacted national legislation implementing the ICC Statute, and that the few
States that have done so, enacted flawed and inconsistent legislation.). The report notes that the
most common problems that are emerging in draft legislation now being prepared or considered are:
· weak definitions of crimes;
· unsatisfactory principles of criminal responsibility and defenses;
· failure to provide for universal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by international
law;
· political control over the initiation of prosecutions;
· failure to provide for the speediest and most efficient procedures for reparations to victims;
· inclusion of provisions that prevent or could potentially prevent cooperation with the
Court;
· failure to provide for persons sentenced by the Court to serve sentences in national prisons;and
· failure to establish training programs for national authorities on effective implementation of the Rome Statute.
/d. at 2.
Also of concern is the failure of some of the implementing legislation to provide adequate procedural guarantees, including the right to fair trial. Further, some national implementing legislation
allows the imposition of the death penalty. This is contrary to Article 77 of the ICC Statute which
provides that the maximum penalty the Court may impose is life imprisonment. It is therefore inap-
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Further, it should be borne in mind that the Court's jurisdiction is designed to target a limited number of "persons for the most serious crimes
of international concern."85 In addition, the high threshold requirements
for the crimes under the ICC Statute, limit the Court's jurisdiction to
crimes against humanity, committed as part of a "widespread or systematic attack,"86 or war crimes when such crimes have been committed as
part of a plan or policy or have taken place on a particularly large scale. 87
The Prosecutor is also required under the ICC Statute to satisfy the Court
that the case is of "sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court."88
In view of the above, the Court will not occupy the field. It will target

only a small portion of perpetrators who are highly responsible for
atrocities and will decline to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in cases in
which deferral to national jurisdiction would be more appropriate. Thus,
the States would still exercise concurrent jurisdiction by prosecuting
others responsible at a lower degree.
B.

SUSPENSION OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTION BY THE
COUNCIL

UN SECURITY

One concern throughout the negotiations for the ICC Statute, expressed
mostly by the permanent members of the Security Council, was the possibility of conflict between the jurisdiction of the Court and the functions
of the Council. It was argued that there may be situations in which the
investigation or prosecution of a particular case by the Court could interfere with the resolution of an ongoing conflict by the Security Council.
Also, the permanent members of the Security Council wanted to preserve
a central role for the Council in the new Court. 89 To this extent, some
lobbied for a provision that would automatically exclude the Court's
jurisdiction over any situation under consideration by the Council. Most
States regarded this proposal as too sweeping and feared it would undermine the Court, for situations could remain pending before the Council indefinitely without its taking any final or serious action. In the end, a
compromise provision was reached, which provided that the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, could adopt a resolution requesting deferral of an investigation or prosecution for a period
propriate that national courts should impose a more severe penalty for a crime under international
law than the one chosen by the international community itself. [d. at 25, 27.
85.
ICC Statute, supra note I, preamble 9, arts. 1,5.
86.
[d. art. 7.
87.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 8.
88.
[d. art. 17(I)(d).
89.
John Seguin, supra note 52, at 95-96.
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of twelve months and that such a request could be renewed at twelvemonth intervals. 90
Article 16 is an unnecessary limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court
because it allows the Security Council, by resolution, to stop a prosecution initiated by a State or the ICC Prosecutor from going forward for an
initial period of twelve months if, in the opinion of the Security Council,
the prosecution will interfere with the Council's efforts to maintain international peace and security under Article vn of the UN Charter. The
Security Council can renew its request indefinitely, in twelve month
segments, under the same conditions. 91 In other words, the UN Security
Council may perpetually intervene to suspend a case before the ICC at
every twelve month interval on identical grounds because Article 16 does
not limit the number of times the UN Security Council may request the
suspension of a case for security reasons.92 This provision was a result of
a compromise suggestion by Singapore to appease the U.S. 93
One of the main reasons for the creation of the ICC was to end the culture of impunity by holding individuals criminally responsible for egregious violations of crimes prohibited by international law.94 Therefore,
the rationale behind the establishment of the ICC is that it would help
end or at least reduce the commission of genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and other related atrocities that shock the conscience
of humankind. Thus, it is an irony of a sort to suggest that the Court's
exercise of jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute individuals accused of
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes may impede the Security Council's efforts to maintain international peace and security under
Article vn of the UN Charter.
It is plausible to suggest that only States that are permanent members of

the Security Council stand in a better position to use this provision to
perpetually forestall the prosecution of a case concerning their nationals.
Members of the Security Council may choose to use this provision to
stop investigations into situations concerning nationals of member States
and would likely do so at the urging of one of its powerful permanent
members. Indeed, in 2002, the U.S. threatened to withdraw its nationals
90.

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 16.

91.
92.

Id.
Id.

93.
John Washburn, The International Criminal Coun Arrivers - The U.S. Position: Status and
Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 873, 878 (2002) (citing Lionel Yee, The International Criminal
Coun and the Security Council, in THE lNrERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE - IsSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, REsULTS 143 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE].
94.
ICC Statute, supra note 1, preamble.
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from UN peacekeeping missions unless the Security Council passed a
resolution grating immunity to U.S. nationals from ICC prosecution.
The Security Council yielded to U.S. pressure and passed Resolution
1422 in July 2002 which deferred the Court's jurisdiction for one year
over personnel of non-State parties participating in peacekeeping missions or operations authorized by the UN.95 Resolution 1422 was renewed for another year by Resolution 1487 in June 2003. 96
While Resolution 1422 was adopted unanimously in 2002, France, Germany and Syria abstained from voting for Resolution 1487 in 2003. In
2004, the U.S. withdrew their request to renew Resolution 1487 because
it failed to receive the necessary votes to again defer the Court's jurisdiction. 97 However, the Security Council has created a precedent that may
be latched onto by other States in the future to demand similar exemptions. To forestall this unnecessary hindrance to the Court's jurisdiction,
it is suggested that Article 16 should be deleted from the Statute. 98
Further, even where the Security Council refers a case to the Court, the
Council may seek to micro-manage the investigation or prosecution of
the case. For instance, Security Council Resolution 1593 which referred
the situation in Darfur to the Court requires the Chief Prosecutor of ICC
to periodically apprise the Security Council of actions taken. 99
Accordingly, the Prosecutor has addressed the Security Council on the

95.
See Security Council Resolution 1422, S.c. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 4572 nd mtg., U.N.
Doc. SlRESIl422 (2002), July 12,2002, available at
<http://www.un.orgIDocs/Scresl2002/sc2002.htm>.
96.
Security Council Resolution 1487, S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. SCOR, 4772 nd mtg., U.N. Doc.
SlRESIl487 (2003), June 12,2003, available at:
<http://www.un.orgIDocs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html>.
97.
See Coalition for the ICC, Chronology of the Adoption and Withdrawal of Security Council Resolutions 1422/1487,
<http://www.iccnow.orgldocuments/declarationsresolutionsIUN1422_2004.html>. The failure to
secure the vote to renew Resolution 1487 was related to concerns over allegations of abuse by U.S.
soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Id. See also, Amnesty International, U.S. Threats to the
International Criminal Court, available at: <http://web.amnesty.orglpages/icc-US_threats-eng>
(visited Feb. 10, 2006).
98.
See Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: The Unlawful Attempt by the
Security Council to Give US Citizens Permanent Impunity From International Justice, AI Index,
lOR 40/006/2003 (a legal analysis of Security Council Resolutions 1422 & 1487 by Amnesty International concluding that the resolution is contrary to the Rome Statute, and also to the United Nations Charter). A summary of the legal analysis is available at:
<http://web.amnesty.orgllibrary/indexlengIOR400082003?Open&of=eng-393> (visited Feb. 10,
2(06).
99.
Security Council Resolution 1593, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158 th mtg., U.N. Doc.
SIRESIl593, 8 (March 31, 2(05) (the Prosecutor is required to address the Council within three
months of the date of adoption of this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken
pursuant to this resolution).
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Darfur situation twice. IOO It is not impossible that the Security Council
may decide at a later stage to invoke Article 16 to stop the Court from
going forward with the case.
The idea that the Security Council should play an oversight role on the
operations of the Court should be resisted.10 1 The Court is envisioned as
an independent entity and should remain as such. The Security Council
should not be allowed to politicize the judicial functions of the Court.
While the Security Council's cooperation with the Court will enhance its
effectiveness, any attempt to subject it to the whims and caprice of the
Security Council will greatly undermine the Court's independence and
credibility. States, particularly developing and "third" world countries,
may view the Court as another vestige of western domination.

C.

FAlLURE TO PROVIDE FOR UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION

The jurisdictional reach of the ICC is more limited than the general international jurisdiction currently enjoyed by States or groups of States
over jus cogens violations. lo2 As noted above, State delegates at the
Rome Conference agreed on a compromised Article 12 which sets out
the preconditions for the Court's jurisdiction when a situation is not referred to the Court by the Security Council. Throughout the Conference,
the U.S. sought to limit the Court's jurisdiction by arguing that the Court
should exercise jurisdiction only against nationals of States Parties or
territorial States on claims of official acts. The United States wanted a
situation in which no U.S. national would ever be brought before the ICC
without U.S. consent. 103

100.
Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to
the Security Council Pursuant to UNSR 1593 (2005), June 29, 2005, available at <http://www.icccpi.intlpressrelease_details&id=108&I=en.htmi> and Second Report of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSR
1593 (2005), Dec. 13,2005, available at
<http://www.icc-cpi.intlcases/current_situationslDarfur_Sudan.html>.
101.
Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 2002-Sep ARMy LAW I, II (2002) (noting that one of the main concerns of the
United States is the limited role played by the United Nations Security Council in the operation of
the ICC).
102.
See also Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over the Nationals of Non-Party
States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAw & CONfEMP. PROBS. 67, 116 (2001) (observing that
"the core crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction - genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are crimes of universal jurisdiction.").
103.
Ruth Wedgwood, Harold K. Jacobson & Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute
of Rome, 95 A.J.I.L. 124, 126 (2001).
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Also, the U.S. demanded a guarantee that no U.S. servicemen or women
would be investigated or prosecuted by the ICC without U.S. consent. 104
It has been suggested that the justification for the U.S. position was that
"more than any other country the United States is expected to intervene
to halt humanitarian catastrophes around the world."105 It was therefore
argued that this position renders U.S. personnel "uniquely vulnerable to
the potential jurisdiction of an international criminal court."I06 According to Ambassador David Scheffer:
The illogical consequence imposed by Article 12, particularly for
non-parties to the treaty, will be to limit severely those lawful,
but highly controversial and inherently risky, interventions that
the advocates of human rights and world peace so desperately
seek from the United States and other military powers. There
will be significant new legal and political risks in such interventions ... 107
Apart from the apparent inequality of this request, its obvious implication is that a guarantee for America would mean a de jure and de facto
exemption of all other States, effectively rendering the purpose of the
Court moribund. 108
Although the U.S. pOSItion was not acceptable to most States at the
Rome Conference, a proposal by Korea that the Court should exercise
jurisdiction where the victim's State or the custodial State has ratified the
ICC Statute was also rejected in order to accommodate U.S. concerns
regarding supposed over-reach of the Court's jurisdiction. 109 Thus, absent submission of a case to the ICC by the UN Security Council, the
Court can only exercise jurisdiction where the case occurs in the territory
of a State Party, or where the crime is committed by a national of a State

104. Id. at 126. See also, Thomas W. Lippman, America Avoids the Stand: Why the U.S. Ob·
jects to a World Criminal Court, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at COl (noting that the American
Government insisted that the Rome Statute must contain an ironclad guarantee that no American
would ever come before the Court).
105. Michael P. Scharf, Rome Diplomatic Conference for an International Criminal Court,
AS.I.L. Insights (June 1998), available at <http://asil.org/insightslinsigh20.htm> (accessed March
15,2002).
106.
Id.
107.
David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AJ.lL. 12, 19
(1999).
108.
Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Para·
dox of "Operation Enduring Freedom", IX ANN. SURV.INT'L & COMPo L. 19,44·45 (2003).
109.
Human Rights Watch, Text Analysis International Criminal Court Treaty, July 17, 1998
available at <http://www.hrw.org/press98/july/icc-anly.htm> (last modified April 4, 2002) [hereinaf·
ter ICC Treaty Text Analysis].
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Party.11O It should be noted that in most cases, the State of nationality
and the territorial State are likely to be the same, as was the case with Pol
Pot of Cambodia, Idi Amin of Uganda, Pinochet of Chile, and as exemplified by the ftrst three State referrals to the Court.
The inclusion of the custodial State would have made it possible to apprehend an accused while traveling outside his or her State, or in the alternative, make it difftcult for the accused to travel outside his or her
State, thereby denying a safe haven anywhere. But, given the way Article
12 was drafted, a country in whose territory an accused is residing will
have no legal basis under the ICC Statute to surrender the accused to the
Court. This is because Article 12 only requires a State Party to submit to
the Court's jurisdiction if the crime was committed on its territory, or the
person accused of the crime is a national. III In other words, in a situation
in which a national of State A commits a crime in State A and then enters
State B ostensibly to evade justice, State B is not obliged to surrender
him or her to the Court because the crime was not committed in State B's
territory and the accused is not a national of State B. The situation becomes compounded if State B is not a State Party to the ICC Statute.
Article 12 also makes it impossible for the victim's State to submit a case
to the ICC if its nationals were victims of international crimes in the territory of another State or by nationals of a non-State Party. It has been
suggested that if a victim's State is allowed to submit a case to the Court,
the Spanish Government would have been in a position to petition the
ICC (if it were then in existence) for the "disappearance" of some Spaniards in Argentina in the 1970s and 80s. 112 This possibility is not available even under the new ICC Statute.
The idea that extending the ICC jurisdiction to include custodial andlor
victim's States or that the current jurisdiction of the Court is overreaching and therefore violates fundamental principles of international law
because it binds non-State Parties ll3 is untenable. The U.S. takes the position that under customary international law, a treaty-based international
court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-Party State
when acting under the direction of such a non-Party State. 1I4
Also, another commentator has suggested that, by conferring upon the
ICC jurisdiction over non-Party nationals, the ICC Statute would abro110.
111.
112.
113.

ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12.
[d. art. 12(2)(a-b).
ICC Treaty Text Analysis, supra note 109.
David Scheffer, supra note 107, at 18.

114.

[d.
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gate the pre-existing rights of non-parties which, in turn, would violate
the law of treaties. IIS Additionally, this commentator suggested that a
State has a right to be free from the exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction
over its nationals which cannot be abrogated by a treaty to which it is not
a Party.116 Cited in support were the ll...C Official Commentaries on the
Vienna Convention to the effect that "international tribunals have been
firm in laying down that in principle treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, neither imposes obligations on States which are not parties nor
modify in any way their legal rights without their consent."117 Furthermore, it was argued that because of the gravity of the outcome, member
States cannot delegate to the ICC their territorial or universal jurisdiction. lls
Those who make the argument that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction
over individuals if his or her State has not ratified the ICC Statute confuse and/or equate the position of a non-Party State with that of its nationals. As would be expected, this argument has been rejected by international law commentators on the simple basis that while a non-Party
State is not itself obligated under a treaty to which it has not consented,
the same cannot be said of its nationals if they commit an offense in the
territory of a State that is a Party.119 Responding to criticism of the
Court's jurisdiction over nationals of non-Party States for crimes committed within the territory of State Parties to the ICC Statute, Judge Philippe Kirsch, current President of the Court, noted as follows:
This does not bind non-parties to the [s]tatute. It simply confirms the recognized principle that individuals are subject to the
substantive and procedural criminal laws applicable in the territories to which they travel, including laws arising from treaty obligations. 120
The above expression is in accordance with Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that "a treaty does not

115.
Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 13,26 (2001).
116.
Id. at 27.
117.
Id.
Id. at 26.
118.
119.
Ruth Wedgwood, et aI., supra note 103, at 127.
120.
Philippe Kirsch, The Rome Conference on the International Criminal Court: A Comment,
1998 A.S.I.L. Newsletter I (1998). Judge Kirsch was the Chairman of the Rome Diplomatic Conference.
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create either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent."121
Also, Article 35 states that a treaty cannot establish an obligation on a
non-Party State unless it "expressly accepts that obligation in writing."122
The ICC Statute does not violate the above provisions of the Vienna
Convention as no provision of the ICC Statute expressly created obligations for non-Party States. Also, allowing the ICC to exercise jurisdiction based on the consent of a custodial or victim's State will not violate
the Vienna Convention either. 123
Suffice it to note that there are plethora of international conventions acceded to by the U.S. and many other States that are globally binding on
nationals of Party and non-Party States because they reflect the common
interest of humanity. 124 No doubt, the crimes prohibited by the ICC Statute reflect the common interest of humanity. At present, any individual
State may try perpetrators of these crimes under universal or territorial
jurisdiction principles without consent from the State of his or her nationality.125 Thus, if individual States can exercise universal jurisdiction
over the same crimes contained in the ICC Statute,126 there has not been
any convincing legal argument to deny a group of States from joining
121.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, V.N. Doc.
AlCONF.39/27 (1969), entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980 reprinted in 1155 V.N.T.S. 331 (1969);
25 ll..M 543 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiesl.
122.
Id. art. 35.
.
123.
Id. art. 38 ("Nothing ... precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon
a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such").
124.
See Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14,1963,220 V.N.T.S. 1969,20 V.S.T. 2941; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 106 V.N.T.S. 1973,22 U.S.T. 1641 (Hague Convention); Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23,1971,178 V.N.T.S.
1975; 24 U.S.T. 565 (Montreal Convention); The International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, Dec. 17,1979,206 U.N.T.S. 1983; 1979 U.S.T. 186; The Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents,
adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 168 V.N.T.S. 1977,28 V.S.T. 1975 (Protected Persons Convention); The
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 1988 V.S.T. LEXIS 202 (Torture Convention); The
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for
signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (Apartheid Convention); The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, 1979 U.S.T. LEXIS 187. These treaties provide
for and obligate States, both states of nationality and territorial states, to exercise jurisdiction or
extradite. Furthermore, the Montreal Convention, the International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages, the Protected Persons Convention, the Torture Convention and the Apartheid Convention allow for the victim's state to either exercise jurisdiction or extradite. The U.S. is a member of
all except the Apartheid Convention.
Paul Amell, International Criminal Law and Universal Jurisdiction, II INT'L LEGAL
125.
PERSP. 53, 60-63 (1999). See also, Attorney-General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 26
(Israel S.Ct. 1962); Demjanjuk V. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571, 582-583 (6th Cir. 1985).
126.
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, a State is permitted to prosecute non-nationals
for certain crimes committed outside that State's territory. See, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 520 (1992); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 300-04 (4th ed. 1990); Kenneth Randall, Universal Jurisdiction
Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785 (1988).
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together to set up a court that does the same thing. Indeed, the Nuremberg tribunal set the precedent for this situation when it stated: "[the Allied Powers] have done together what anyone of them might have done
singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set
up special courts to administer law."127
In view of the above, it cannot be argued that the Court's exercise of
treaty-based jurisdiction over the nationals of non-Party State for international crimes contravenes this rule of international law .128 Therefore, the
argument that the ICC Statute is "overreaching" because it purportedly
obligates non-Party States through the exercise of jurisdiction over their
nationals is a gross distortion of customary international law. 129 Conferring the ICC with universal jurisdiction helps to realize one of the objectives behind the establishment of the Court, which is, to ensure there is
no safe sanctuary for individuals wanted for committing egregious
crimes.
Until the Court is invested with universal jurisdiction, we will continue
to see cases similar to the case of Charles Taylor, former president of
Liberia, who found safe haven in Nigeria despite an international arrest
warrant for his surrender to a tribunal in Sierra Lone. Nigeria is under
pressure to surrender Mr. Taylor to the Sierra Leonean tribunal but has
refused based upon the terms of their asylum agreement with Mr. Taylor. 130 It would be a different situation if Mr. Taylor was wanted by the
ICC after he had successfully fled to or was granted amnesty by a non127. See, Nuremberg Charter, supra note 47, at 216-17.
128.
Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of
Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L.R. 363, 376 (2001).
129.
See Human Rights Watch, The ICC Jurisdictional Regime; Addressing U.S. Arguments,
available at <hup:/Iwww.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-regime.htm> (last modified April 4,
2002).
130. Mr. Obasanjo, Nigerian's President takes the position that it granted asylum to Mr. Taylor
pursuant to the so called Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord to prevent a bloodbath in Uberia on
the understanding that he would not be required to try or surrender Mr. Taylor to an International
Tribunal except at the request of the Government of Uberia or if Mr. Taylor violates his undertaking
not to interfere in Uberian politics. See James Seitua, Why Obasanjo Has Not Turned Taylor Over?,
THE
PERSPECTIVE,
Atlanta,
Georgia,
May
31,
2005,
available
at:
<http://www.theperspective.org/Articles/0531200502.html> (visited Feb. 28, 2006); BBC NEWS,
Taylor meets Obasanjo in Nigeria, Feb. 27, 2006, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uklgo/pr/fr/l2lhilafrical4754982.stm> (visited Feb. 28, 2006); BBC NEWS, Taylor off Agenda at Abuja Talks,
March 4, 2006, available at:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2Ihi/africal4775012.stm> (reporting that Mr. Taylor's departure
into exile was part of a deal backed by African and Western powers and quoting BBC's Elizabeth
Blunt in Abuja as saying that the terms of the deal are believed to have included a comfortable home
in Nigeria and a pledge that he would not be handed over for prosecution. BBC News also quoted
Remi Oyo, Mr. Obasanjo's spokeswoman that "the prerogative of the return of former President
Taylor remains that of the Uberian people and Government."); BBC NEWS, Taylor Meets Obasanjo
in Nigeria, Feb. 27, 2006, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/golpr/fr/-/2/hi/africal4754982.stm>
(visited Feb. 28, 2006).
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Party State. The non-Party State would have no obligation whatsoever to
surrender Mr. Taylor to the Court and in that circumstance Mr. Taylor
would find a safe haven in that State. Also, even if Mr. Taylor finds
himself in the territory of a State Party to the ICC Statute, that State cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court if Mr. Taylor did not commit the
crime in the territory of that State and he is not a national of the State
Party. In the above scenario, the 'traveling tyrant' is allowed to exploit
the limitation in the ICC jurisdiction to evade justice. l3l

D.

WAR CRIMES OPT-OUT PROVISION

With pressure from the U.S., the Rome Conference agreed on Article 124
which allows a State Party to opt out of the Court's jurisdiction for war
crimes committed on its territory or by its nationals in internal armed
conflict for seven years after becoming a Party to the ICC Statute. 132 The
U.S. representatives to the Rome Conference had sought a ten year "opt
out" from the Court's jurisdiction over war crimes, but the Conference
agreed only to a seven year opt-out period.133 Article 124 provides a
compromise capable of "undermining the status of war crimes as truly
universal crimes [that might] result in a court with a fragmented jurisdiction."l34 Such a declaration effectively grants immunity from prosecution
for those who commit war crimes in the future while their actions continue to cause immense suffering to humankind for years to come.
Therefore, the opt-out provision has been criticized as creating a legally
and morally unjustifiable loophole to the evasion of justice. 135
Currently, only Columbia and France have availed themselves of the
provisions of Article 124.136 Fortunately, the Burundian Government's
131.
Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Cadern, supra note 65, at 414, n.194 (attributing the
phrase "traveling tyrant" to Jelena Pejic, representative of the Lawyer's Committee at the Rome
Conference).
132.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 124. Article 124 provides that a state Party to the ICC may
elect to exempt its nationals from the jurisdiction of the Court for a non-renewable period of seven
years from the date of ratification of the statute for war crimes.
133.
See David Scheffer, U.N. InternatioTUll CrimiTUll Court, Statement Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the U.S. SeTUlte (July 23,1998) available at 1998 WL 12762512.
134.
Jonathan Stanley, Focus: InternatioTUll CrimiTUll Court: A Court that Knows No Boundaries?: The IntematioTUll CrimiTUll Court Treaty is a Big Achievement but Can it Deliver what it
Promises?, THE LAWYER, Aug. II, 1998, available at 1998 WL 9167987.
135.
Philippe Kirsch, Q.c., The International CrimiTUll court: Current Issues and Perspectives,
64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10 (2001).
136.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Declarations and Reservations,
available at
<http://untreaty.un.orglENGLISHlbiblelenglishinternetbiblelpartYchapterXVIWtreaty II.asp#N7>
[hereinafter ICC Statute: Declarations and Reservationsj.
The Columbian Article 124 Declaration states as follows:
5. Availing itself of the option provided in Article 124 of the Statute and subject to the
conditions established therein, the Government of Colombia declares that it does not ac-
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desire to make an Article 124 declaration was rejected by their Senate. 137
The "opt out" clause is an unwarranted restriction on the Court's jurisdiction which will severely hamper its effectiveness for years, if not decades. 138 While it is reassuring that only two States have made the Article
124 declaration, it is necessary however that States demonstrate their
willingness to hold war criminals accountable by ensuring that Article
124 is deleted from the ICC Statute when it comes up for review in
2009.139
E.

RELIANCE ON STATES' COOPERATION

Generally, in order for the Court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction,
the Court must rely on the ability and willingness of State Parties to discharge their obligations under the ICC Statute. l40 In the preamble to the
ICC Statute, States Parties affirm that '''the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by
taking measures at the national level and by international cooperation."141
With the efforts of like-minded States, 142 delegates at the Rome
Conference agreed on the need for effective and speedy cooperation with
the Court. As a result, Part 9 of the ICC Statute contains the obligations

cept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in Article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by Colombian nationals or on Colombian territory.
The French Government Article 124 Declaration states:
III. Declaration under Article 124
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the
French Republic declares that it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court
with respect to the category of crimes referred to in Article 8 when a crime is
alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory.
137. See Amnesty International, Burundi - Urge the President to Ratify the Rome Statute of the
ICC, available at <http://web.arnnesty.org/pageslicc-290104-action-eng> (Appeal Letter from Amnesty International urging the Burundian Government to ratify the Rome Statute without such a
'license to kill' declaration. The ICC Statute was ratified by Burundi on Sept. 21, 2004, without
such declaration. See ICC Statute: Declarations and Reservations, supra note 136.
138. James Rodgers, War Crimes Coun Under Fire, 1998 ABA JOUR. 68 (Sept. 1998) (quoting
Jelena Pejic, Senior Program Coordinator, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York).
139. Article 124 is subject to review at the Review Conference which is scheduled to take place
seven years after the entry into force of the ICC Statute. Since the ICC Statute came into force in
2002, the Review Conference will be held in 2009. See ICC Statute, supra note I, arts. 123, 124.
140.
Hans-Peter Kau, Developments at the International Criminal Coun: Construction Site For
More Justice: The International Criminal Coun After Two Years, 99 A.J.l.L. 370, 383 (2005)(noting
that "the hopes and expectations at the International Criminal Court are that the states parties will
support it as responsible joint owners by engaging in unreserved and systematic cooperation in
matters of criminal law").
141.
ICC Statute, supra note 1, preamble, para. 4.
142. See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Coun: The Negotiating Process, 93 A.J.lL. 2,4 (1999).
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of international cooperation and judicial assistance of States Parties to
the Court. 143
When a State ratifies the ICC Statute, it assumes the obligation to
"cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court."I44 Further, the ICC Statute
requires that States Parties ensure that there are procedures under their
national law for all fonns of cooperation specified in the Statute. 145
A significant aspect of this obligation is arresting and surrendering
persons accused of crimes to the Court. l46 This is necessary as the Court
cannot try an accused person in absentia. 147 Thus, "a decision by the
Prosecutor to bring charges against an accused will prompt the critical,
indeed crucial question of arrests and transfer to The Hague."148 In other
words, the Court would be unable to exercise its jurisdiction if States
refused, delayed or otherwise failed to carry out their obligation to arrest
and/or surrender the accused to the Court. There is no doubt that "the
credibility of the Court would suffer if an arrest warrant issued by the
judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the request of the prosecutor pursuant
to Article 58 remained ineffective over a long period because the States
Parties were slow, or failed, to execute it."149

143.
For a discussion of the cooperation regime in the Rome Statute, see Bruce Broomhall, The
International Criminal Coun: Overview, and Cooperation with States, in 1999 ICC RATIFICATION
AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 45 (Nouvelles Etudes Penales, 1999); Annalisa
Ciampi, Other Forms of Cooperation, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A COMMENTARY 1705 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, & John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002)
[hereinafter THE ROME STATUTE: A COMMENTARY]; Frederik Harhoff & Phakiso Mochochoko,
International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 637 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001);
Hans-Peter Kaul & Claus Kress, Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International
Criminal Coun: Principles and Compromises, 1999 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 143 (1999);
Claus Kress, et aI., International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance: Preliminary Remarks, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 46, at 1045; Phakiso Mochochoko, International
Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, in THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 93, at
305; Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry, & John McManus, The Cooperation of States with the International Criminal Coun, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 767 (2002); Bert Swart & Goran Sluiter, The International Criminal Coun and International Criminal Co-operation, in REFLECTIONS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 91 (Herman von Hebel et al. eds., 1999).
144.
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 86.
145. Id. art. 88.
146. Id. art. 89.
147.
Id. art. 63. Article 63 makes it very clear that "the accused shall be present during the
trial" and that there can thus be no trials in absentia.
148.
Hans-Peter Kaul, supra note 23, at 375 (citing the Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr.
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (Sept. 8, 2003).
149.
Hans-Peter Kaul, supra note 23, at 383.
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Apart from other express and implicit obligations contained in the ICC
Statute, Article 93 of the Statute details certain specific cooperation
obligations on States parties to assist the Court with respect to
investigations and prosecutions.1 5o These obligations are by no means
exhaustive but should at least represent a minimal requirement on States
Parties to the ICC Statute. However, a study by Amnesty International in
2004 reveals that States Parties' response to their obligations under the
Statute has been disappointing. 151 The study notes that among the few
States that have adopted national legislation implementing their
obligations under the ICC Statute, almost all the States have taken a
minimalist approach to cooperation with the Court and few have
included provisions that go beyond the express requirements of the ICC
Statute. 152 This author shares the concern of Amnesty International that
"if every state Party were to take a minimalist approach to implementing
its cooperation obligations, the effectiveness of the Court would be
greatly reduced, leading in some cases to impunity."153

150.
Article 93 provides:
1. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and under procedures of national law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following assistance in relation to investigations or prosecutions:
(a) The identification and whereabouts of persons or the location of items;
(b) The taking of evidence, including testimony under oath, and the production of evidence, including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Court;
(c) The questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted;
(d) The service of documents, including judicial documents;
(e) Facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons as witnesses or experts
before the Court;
(f) The temporary transfer of persons as provided in paragraph 7;
(g) The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and examination of grave sites;
(h) The execution of searches and seizures;
(i) The provision of records and documents, including official records and
documents;
(j) The protection of victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence;
(k) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property
and assets and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties; and
(I) Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 93(1)(a-I).
151. See AI: Failure of States to Enact Effective Implementing Legislation, supra note 84.
152.
Id. at 32.
153. Id. Regarding the situation in Darfur, Sudan, see, SUDAN TRmUNE, ICC Delegation to
Visit Sudan's Darfur, Feb. 27, 2006, available at:
<http://www.sudantribune.comlArticle.php3?id_Article=14271> (visited Feb. 28, 2006) (reporting
that the ICC Prosecutor, Mr. Moreno Ocampo has told the Security Council that the International
Criminal Court and the African Union, which has troops in Darfur, had drawn up a Cooperation
Agreement in May 2005, which still was not signed).
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ARTICLE 98 IMMUNITY AGREEMENTS

While the ICC Statute requires States Parties to ensure that there are
procedures under their national law for all forms of cooperation specified
in the Statute,154 some States Parties have taken steps that make their
compliance with Article 88 impossible, such as entering into an "immunity" agreement with the U.S. The bilateral immunity agreement is an
undertaking by the States concerned that U.S. persons will not be surrendered to the Court without U.S. consent. 155 The Bush administration has
threatened ICC States Parties with withdrawal of military aid, including
education, training, and financing the purchases of equipment and weaponry, if they fail to protect Americans serving in their countries from
ICC's reach.156 By May of 2005, about 100 States have signed this immunity agreement which is referred to colloquially as the "Article 98
Agreement. "157

It has been suggested that "these bilateral agreements ... are provided for
under Article 98 of the Rome Statute."15S This argument is inapposite.1 59
Article 98, which emerged at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, was
drafted to address the question of the relationship between the
154.
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 88.
155.
Christopher Marquis, U.S. Seeking Pacts in a Bid to Shield its Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 6, 2002.
156.
Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers' Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2002, at Ai.
157.
See U.S. Department of State Press Statement, U.S. Signs JOOth Article 98 Agreement,
May 3, 2005, 2005/463, available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/palprs/ps12005/45573.htm> (the press
statement notes that on May 2, 2005, Angola became the lOOth country to conclude such an agreement with the United States). As of May 18,2005, Amnesty International reports that the States that
have ratified an immunity agreement with the USA include Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana,
Guyana, Honduras, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Timor-l..este, and Uzbekistan have ratified such agreements. See Amnesty International, available at: <http://web.arnnesty.orglpages/int.Jus_icc_imp_agrees> (last updated May 18,2(05).
158.
Id. See also, Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10
EUR. J.INT'L L. 93 (1999).
159.
For a detailed analysis on this, see generally, Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: U.S. Efforts to Obtain Immunity For Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes, AI Index: lOR 40102512002, Sept. 2, 2002, [hereinafter U.S. Efforts to Obtain Immunity
Agreement) available at <http://web.arnnesty.orgllibrary/indexlengIOR4oo252002?Open&of=eng385> (visited Feb. 10,2(06); Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: The Needfor the
European Union to Take More Effective Steps to Prevent Members From Signing US Immunity
Agreements, AI Index: lOR 401030/2002, Oct. 1,2002, available at:
<http://web.arnnesty.orgllibrary/indexlengior400302002?open&of=eng-385> (visited February 10,
2006); Human Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the International Criminal Court:
Article 98 (2) Agreements, July 9, 2002, available at
<www.hrw.orglcarnpaignslicdicc_Article98.pdf> (visited Feb. 10,2006) (expressing the view "that
existing U.S. SOFAs are not the type of agreement that would qualify under Article 98 (2), and
cannot trump any obligations under the Rome Statute."); Steffen Wirth, Immunities, Related
Problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute, 12 CRIM. L.F. 429 (2001).
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obligations of States Parties under the future ICC Statute and existing
obligations of States Parties under international law .160
Article 98, paragraph 1, deal exclusively with the limited question of the
relationship between the obligations of States Parties to the ICC Statute
and their prior obligations under customary or conventional international
law concerning diplomatic immunities and State immunities, particularly
those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 161
On the other hand, Article 98 paragraph 2 was intended to address the
question of the effect of the ICC Statute on existing Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFAs).162 As explained by Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus
Kress, both members of the German delegation, Article 98 (2) was designed to address possible - not certain - conflicts between existing obligations under SOFAs and under the ICC Statute:
The idea behind the provision [Article 98 (2)] was to solve legal
conflicts which might arise because of Status of Forces Agreements which are already in place. On the contrary, Article 98 (2)
was not designed to create an incentive for (future) States Parties
to conclude Status of Forces Agreements which amount to an
obstacle to the execution of requests for cooperation issued by
the Court. 163
Similarly, Kimberly Prost, a member of the Canadian delegation, and
Angelika Schlunck, a member of the German delegation, have noted that
160.
u.s. Efforts to Obtain Immunity Agreement, supra note 159, at 7. Article 98 (cooperation
with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender) reads:
I. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third
State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of
the immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements
pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that
State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State
for the giving of consent for the surrender.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 98(1 )(2).
161.
u.s. Efforts to Obtain Immunity Agreement, supra note 159, at 7. William A. Schabas,
supra note 38, at 92; See also, BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 145 (2003);
John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, in I THE ROME STATUTE: A
COMMENTARY, supra note 143, at 667.
162.
U.S. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IMMUNITY AGREEMENT, supra note 159, at 7.
163.
Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, supra note 143, at 165. See also, Christopher Keith
Hall, The First Five Sessions of the UN Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, 94 A.J.I.L. 773, 786 n.36 (2000) (noting that Article 98 (2) was added to address existing
agreements on status of forces).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

29

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 12 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 9

214

ANNUAL SURVEY OFINT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. XIT

States were concerned with existing international obligations when drafting Article 98. 164 Thus, "it would be very hard indeed to concede by way
of an interpretative statement that a State Party acted in confonnity with
its obligation to 'fully cooperate' with the Court in concluding [a] new
Statu[s] of Forces Agreement to this effect."165
However, even if Article 98 (2) were to be construed by the Court to
apply to renewed SOFAs and new SOFAs entered into by States Parties
to the ICC Statute, these agreements would have to be consistent with the
object and purpose of the Statute, as well as with other rules of
international law. 166 The object and purpose of the ICC Statute is to end
immunity by ensuring that no one is above the law and immune from the
law of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. 167 Article 98
"immunity" agreements are what their name implies - an immunity of
U.S. nationals from the Court's jurisdiction. Therefore, to the extent that
the immunity agreement is intended to insulate certain persons from the
Court's jurisdiction, the immunity agreement is inconsistent with the
object and purpose of the ICC Statute. States Parties to the ICC Statute
should therefore not enter into such immunity agreements as they are
obligated to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of the treaty. 168

164.

Kimberly Prost & Ange1ika Sch1unck, Article 98, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE By ARTICLE II31 (Otto

Triffterer, ed.,1999) ("All States participating in the negotiations in Rome had concerns about
conflicts with existing international obligations. Thus, there are several provisions within Part 9,
including those in Articles 90, 93 para. 9 and 98 which address that concern. ... Even States which
advocated for a strong Court were concerned about actions taken pursuant to this Statute, which
would violate these existing fundamental obligations at international law.").
165.
Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kress, supra'note 143, at 174.
166.
U.S. Efforts to Obtain Immunity Agreement, supra note 159, at 9 (citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art. 31(1». Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties provides that: "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose."
167.
ICC Statute, supra note 1, preamble, para. 5, art. 27(1). Article 27(1) provides that:
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of
a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a Government official shall in
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
168.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art. 18 ("A state is obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty ... "). See, Judy Dempsey,
Accords with US 'Will Violate' ICC Treaty, FINANCIAL TiMES, 27 Aug. 2002, (referring to the text
of the legal opinion of European Union's legal experts which concluded that a:
[Clontracting Party to the statute concluding such an agreement with the US acts against
the object and purpose of the statute and thereby violates its general obligation to perform
the obligations of the statutes in good faith. . .. [a contracting Party's] legal obligation
vis-a-vis its co-contracting parties and the Court to surrender a person to the Court upon
request cannot be modified by concluding an agreement of the kind proposed by the US.
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Furthennore, the conclusion of immunity agreements between States
Parties to the ICC Statute and the United States or any other State is
questionable, as it contradicts the customary international law principle
of pacta sunt servanda, which obligates a State Party to a treaty not to do
anything that will undermine its treaty obligations. '69 Besides, the validity of these bilateral immunity agreements are doubtful considering that
they were procured under coercion '70 and/or by threat l7l of withdrawal of
military aid, including education, training, and financing the purchases of
equipment and weaponry if the States failed to sign the immunity agreements.172
Also, the immunity agreements are void because they contradict a primary norm of pacta sunt servanda l73 which is undoubtedly universally
recognized as a peremptory nonn of customary international law. '74
States Parties to the ICC agreed in Article 88 to "ensure that there are
procedures available under their national law for all fonns of cooperation" listed in Part 9 of the Rome Statute. Therefore, any national
legislation, procedures or practices which would delay or obstruct full
cooperation with the Court would be inconsistent with States Parties'
obligations under the ICC Statute. 175
Thus, since States Parties to the ICC have an affinnative duty to comply
immediately with requests by the ICC to arrest and surrender accused
persons in their territories,176 they should be concluding agreements that
will expedite this obligation. However, the essence of these bilateral treaties with the United States is to insulate U.S. nationals from the jurisdic169.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith").
170.
The expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the
coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without any legal
effect. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art.51, 52
171.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art. 52 ("A treaty is void if its
conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of internationallaw embodied in the Charter of the United Nations").
172. See Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers' Immunity, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10,2002, at AI.
173.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, art. 53 provides:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.
174.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 121, preamble, para 3, (noting
that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are universally
recognized).
175.
Checklist for Effective Implementation, supra note 22, at 9.
176.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 59(1).
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tion of the ICC, which will directly affect the ability of the Court to
prosecute those accused of committing international crimes. The ICC
was created to ensure that anyone, irrespective of his or her position, who
commits international crime, is held accountable for his or her actions.
Therefore, there is no doubt that State Parties to the ICC are violating
their international obligations under the Statute by signing such immunity agreements and that such violations could lead to a finding of noncooperation pursuant to Article 87, paragraph 7.177
IV. CONCLUSION
The highlighted bottlenecks in the Court's effective exercise of jurisdiction are by no means exhaustive. Due to sovereignty concerns, some of
the noted impediments were not mere oversights, but compromises that
had to be made in order to gather enough support to establish the Court.
After the establishment of the ICC, it is very unlikely that the international community may establish another ad hoc international or hybrid
criminal tribunal to prosecute persons accused of international crimes. 178
Thus, the continued application of international individual criminal responsibility rests with the Court. It is therefore imperative that the Court
be endowed with sufficient personal jurisdiction in order to ensure that
perpetrators of egregious international crimes do not go unpunished.
While there is nothing to suggest that these sovereignty concerns are
waning, it is nevertheless imperative that the international community
ensure the effective operation of the Court and enable the Court to
achieve its stated objective. Fortunately, there is an expectation from
States Parties that the ICC Statute requires further elaboration as reflected by the requirement to review the Statute within seven years of
entry into force. 179
A meaningful review of the ICC Statute should consider amending the
operation of the complementarity principle at least to grant the Court
primary jurisdiction over the crime of genocide 180 and certain categories
of offenders who by virtue of their official position are unlikely to be
177.
Checklist for Effective Implementation, supra note 22, at 9.
178.
For instance, instead of establishing another ad hoc tribunal in the Sudan, the Security
Council chose to refer the situation in Darfur to the Court.
179.
ICC Statute, supra note I, art. 123.
180.
See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
U.N. Doc. N49/10 (1994) art. 21 (prescribing inherent jurisdiction to the ICC only for the crime of
genocide); 10han D. van der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1.20 (2000) (noting that the United States was willing to
concede "inherent jurisdiction" of the ICC in regard to the crime of genocide).
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genuinely prosecuted domestically.181 The application of complementarity principle serves as a labyrinth capable of rendering the Court otiose.
Thus, the complementarity principle remains a viable threat to the future
of the international criminal system and the effectiveness of the Court.
Also, it is worrisome that States may, under the guise of complementarity, shield their nationals from the Court and only selectively refer situations or surrender accused persons to the Court that it does not want to
deal with. 182 This kind of selective referral by States may unwittingly
expose the Court to accusations of aiding the State to pursue its vendetta
against perceived opponents. A perception of the Court as an avenue to
pursue victor's justice will not augur well for the image of the Court.
Furthermore, States Parties at the next review conference should delete
Article 124 from the Statute because its retention sends a dangerous signal that it is okay to commit war crimes for seven years before accountability can be attributed. Equally, Article 16 should be deleted from the
ICC Statute. The idea that the Security Council may block the Court's
jurisdiction is troubling as it is an invitation for political meddling in
judiciary function. It puts the independence and credibility of the Court
at issue. At the same time, it exposes the Court to allegations of western
dominance. There is no doubt that an effective and independent judiciary can only be achieved when courts are institutionally shielded from
direct political influence. Independence of the judiciary is a sine qua non
to an effective and credible national court.
There is no reason why the ICC Statute, which exerts its independent
status, should not confer unfettered independence on the Court's exercise
of jurisdiction. 183 It is an irony that while the ICC is not an organ of the
181. Such amendment would draw from the Statute of the Sierra Leone which restricted the
primacy jurisdiction of the tribunals to "those who bear the greatest responsibility" for the atrocities.
See The Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, as amended, annexed to the SecretaryGeneral's Sierra Leone Report, available at: <http://www.un.orgIDocs/sc!reports/2000/915e.pdf>,
also available at: <http://www.sc-sl.org!scsl-statute.html>.
182.
Claus Kress, 'Self-Referrals' and 'Waivers of Complementarity' Some Considerations in
Law and Policy, 2 J. 1Nr'L. CRIM. Jus. 944, 946 (2004) (noting that States may embark on 'selective
or asymmetrical self-referral' where the de jure Government is itself Party to an internal" armed
conflict).
183.
See ICC Statute, supra note 4, art. 2; Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations
and the International Criminal Court, Oct. 4, 2004, UN Doc. Al58/874, U.N. Doc.
PCNICCI20011l/Add.l, preamble 4, U.N. Doc. Al58/874, annex (2004) (entered into force Oct. 4,
2004). (Preamble 4 to the Relationships Agreement states expressly that "the International Criminal
Court is established as an independent permanent institution in relationship with the United Nations."). Thus, the ICC is not a specialized agency of the UN nor does it otherwise belong to the
"UN Family." For a discussion on the earlier draft of the Relationship Agreement, see Daryl A.
Mundis, The Assembly of States Parties and the Institutional Framework of the International Criminal Court, 97 A.J.I.L. 132 (2003).
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United Nations, it nevertheless submits itself to the direction of the UN
Security Council. Should the Security Council be allowed to prevent
ICC investigations or prosecutions willy nilly, this will violate the principle of prosecutorial independence. l84
This study argues unequivocally that the conclusion of bilateral immunity agreements between States Parties and the U.S. which serves to insulate U.S. nationals from the Court's jurisdiction is indubitably a violation of the obligations of States Parties under the ICC Statute. Such immunity agreements fly in opposition to the States Parties' obligations
under the ICC Statute. Therefore, there is the need to discourage States
Parties from concluding the so called "Article 98" immunity agreement.
Without States Parties' assistance and cooperation to surrender accused
persons to the Court, the Prosecutor and the Court will face a formidable
challenge in discharging the objective of the ICC Statute. The Office of
the Prosecutor and the Court will constantly be confronted with a special
problem and will need to make special efforts to ensure the ready and
voluntary support and cooperation of States Parties.
Thus, while it is the position of this author that the provisions of Article
98 clearly reflect an intent to protect existing SOFAs agreements, it now
appears necessary to redraft Article 98 at the next review conference to
remove any perceived ambiguity that supports the contention that it extends beyond existing SOFAs.
The obstacles highlighted above do not detract from the efforts of the
delegates at the Rome Conference that made the establishment of the
ICC possible nor do they ignore the political dynamics associated with
negotiating international treaties. Rather, this paper invites the international community to demonstrate its support for the Court by mustering
the political will to cooperate fully with the Court and free the Court
from the inherent bottlenecks in the Statute that lessen the effectiveness
of the Court.

184.

Bartram S. Brown, supra note 51, 389.
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